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Abstract
Risk behavior can be capricious and may vary from month to month. We study 62 clients of a private bank in Northern Italy.
The individuals are of special interest for several reasons. As active traders, they manage the value-at-risk (VaR) of a portion
of their wealth portfolios. In addition, they act alone, i.e., without input from a financial adviser. Based on VaR-statistics,
we find that, in general, the subjects become more risk-averse after suffering losses and more risk-seeking after experiencing
gains. The monthly gains and losses that alter investor risk behavior represent true changes in wealth but are “on paper” only,
i.e., not immediately realized. Our results allow several interpretations, but they are not at odds with a house money effect,
or the possibility that overconfident investors trade on illusions. Rapidly shifting risk behavior in fast response to unstable
circumstances weakens individual risk tolerance as a deep parameter and key construct of finance theory.
Keywords: risk attitude, gains perception, losses perception, decision making
1 Introduction
“There are two times in aman’s life when he should
not speculate. When he can’t afford it, and when
he can.” Mark Twain, Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New
Calendar, 1897
Speculative gambling is risky business. While Mark
Twain counsels against investment bets, no matter what, his
words admit that people’s changing fortunes often have a
bearing on what they decide to do.
Understanding how prior gains and losses affect risk atti-
tudes is a significant question in the study of intertemporal
choice. Research in this field has produced various perplex-
ing results. Some experimental studies suggest that individ-
uals often become more willing to gamble following gains
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(Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Other studies propose either that
individuals become more risk-seeking after losses (Langer
& Weber, 2008) or, the opposite, more risk-averse (Shiv et
al., 2005; Liu et al., 2010).1 Here, we investigate the degree
to which the experience of gains and losses influences sub-
sequent asset allocation choices made by a sample of clients
of an Italian private bank. Thus, we look at the risk behav-
ior of real-world investors, the paper gains or losses in their
portfolios, and their monthly asset allocation changes during
the year 2015.2
As it happens, supervisory authorities in Italy and else-
where require banks and other financial intermediaries to
identify the risk profile of each client — commonly on a
scale that runs between “no-risk” and “risk-seeking”. The
level of hazard assumed by an investor’s portfolio is sup-
posed to correspond to his or her risk profile. This is why
financial service firms assess a value-at-risk (VaR) measure
which determines themaximum amount of potential loss and
1The evidence on intertemporal choice and risk-taking is multifaceted.
For instance, Weber and Zuchel (2005) show that manipulations of the
presentation format can induce both types of behavior. In a later study of
myopic loss aversion, Langer and Weber (2008) find a strong interaction
effect between how long an investor is bound by his initial decision and
feedback frequency. Andrade and Iyer (2009) find that people may intend
to bet less after a loss but end up betting more because they underestimated
how the negative emotion linked to the loss would affect later decisions.
2The distinction between realized capital gains or losses and paper gains
or losses ismeaningful. The former are generatedwhenmoney is transferred
between accounts (e.g., the sale of an asset that fell in price) but the latter
do not generate any associated cash flows. In an informative article that
starts with a useful synopsis of prior work, Imas (2016) finds that, following
realized losses, individuals tend to avoid risk but, if they sit on paper losses,
they are inclined to take on greater risk. We thank a referee for telling us
about Imas’s work.
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its probability within a specific time frame. Banks and finan-
cial intermediaries gather information about clients through
forms approved by supervisory authorities. The question-
naires list demographic and financial characteristics such as
age, gender, level of education, work experience, financial
knowledge and wealth. These characteristics determine the
level of VaR that is suitable for a given investor.3 Banks
and financial intermediaries must check whether the VaR of
a particular portfolio matches its owner’s risk profile. The
portfolio VaR fluctuates over time as an investor modifies his
or her asset allocation, but it can never be allowed to exceed
the investor’s VaR.
We examine monthly asset allocation changes made by
clients of an Italian private bank. The bank in question
considers six levels of VaR: 0 represents “no-risk”; 1, “low-
risk”; 2, “prudent balanced risk”; 3, “balanced risk”; 4,
“aggressive balanced risk”; and 5 “high-risk”. The greater
the loss a specific investor is able to tolerate, the higher the
VaR is permitted to be. To repeat, VaR itself assesses the
level of risk of the portfolio. This aspect of our study is
noteworthy since — as far as we know, without exception—
past empirical research on investor trading assesses only the
risks and returns associated with individual transactions.
Portfolio allocation decisions are often altered by an in-
vestor’s advisor (see, e.g., Foerster et al., 2017). Evidently,
the fact that advisors guide investors makes it difficult to
interpret the findings of an analysis like the one already
outlined. That is why we opt for a much smaller sample
comprised only of investors who act on their own (i.e., with-
out experienced advisors) and who all qualify for the highest
level of VaR.
Our paper contributes to the literature on dynamic choice
under risk and uncertainty. How do past gains and/or losses
influence the level of downside risk assumed by investors?
Section 2 summarizes past research and “what we know”
about risk behavior. Sections 3 presents our data collection
effort. Section 4 presents the main hypothesis and the meth-
ods that are used. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6
concludes.
2 Theory and literature
A central feature of prospect theory and its successor, cu-
mulative prospect theory, is that people are not consistently
risk-averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Rather, people
3There are various ways to calculate VaR. See, e.g., Holton (2014).
Each Italian bank is free to choose its own preferred method. The method
of choice has to be approved by the Commissione Nazionale per le Società
e la Borsa (Consob), however. The bank that provided data for this study
uses Monte Carlo methods. Note that VaR is a view of risk that emphasizes
downward risk and the wish for financial security. For more discussion of
the diverse concepts of portfolio risk applied in financial economics, see
Shefrin and Statman (2000).
are risk-seeking in the domain of losses and risk-averse in
the domain of gains, with gains and losses defined relative
to a target or reference point. Also, individuals feel the pain
of a loss more acutely than the pleasure of an equal-sized
gain. These basic insights are corroborated by many exper-
imental studies of risky decision making.4 Kahneman even
dismisses as a “myth” the widespread belief among finance
experts that the task of an advisor is to find a portfolio that
fits the investor’s attitude to risk. The fundamental problem
with individual risk tolerance, Kahneman submits, is that
“there is no such thing” (2009, p. 1).5
Thaler and Johnson (1990) demonstrate that people tend
to assume higher risk immediately following a previous gain.
This psychological tendency is labeled the house money ef-
fect. It is supported by the further laboratory experiments of
Battalio et al. (1990), Keasey and Moon (1996), and Ackert
et al. (2006). Franken et al. (2006) study the Iowa Gam-
bling Task of Bechara et al. (2000), which involves repeated
choices among four decks of cards, two of which have nega-
tive expected value because they lead to large but infrequent
losses. Young adults who experienced gains make more
gainful and safer choices afterward than people who were
subjected to losses. Then again, in an adaptation of Franken
et al., Rosi et al. (2016) find that previous episodes makes
no difference. As mentioned, Imas (2016) shows that many
individuals with paper losses accept more risk but that, once
a loss is realized, they take less risk. Imas also replicates
selected findings of Shiv et al. (2005), Weber and Zuchel
(2005), and Langer and Weber (2008).
Besides theory and laboratory-type experiments, there
is limited empirical evidence. However, Malmendier and
Nagel (2011) and Bucciol and Zarri (2015) look at the long-
lasting effects on risk attitudes of traumatic experiences such
as the Great Depression. Weber et al. (2012) use repeated
surveys of British investors to study their risk taking dur-
ing (and closely after) the 2008 financial crisis. Frino et
al. (2008) consider the behavior of futures traders in Aus-
tralia. Liu et al. (2010) look at market-makers in the Taiwan
Futures Exchange. Gains earned during morning hours ap-
pear to produce above average risk-taking during afternoon
trading. In addition, Hsu and Chow (2013) study individual
investors in Taiwan. After substantial gains, investors as-
sume greater risks. Hsu and Chow notice that, as time goes
4Still, various complexities result in further choice paradoxes examined
by Battalio et al. (1990), Birnbaum (2008), Callen et al. (2014) and others.
5How prospect theory works in practice further depends on its editing
phase. The framing of the decision problem is all-important. On one view,
at some point in time, each individual investor opens a separate mental
account for every distinctly identifiable portfolio (even as his/her total wealth
may be spread over quite a few portfolios). Within each account, risk is
managed in isolation, perhaps with the aim of reaching a given target or, at a
minimum, in order to preserve the status-quo (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Therefore,
capital preservation, and risk control, may be more urgent for large size
portfolios.
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by, the house money effect slowly weakens. Lastly, Lien and
Zheng (2015) look at slot machinge gambling.6
Clearly, it is difficult to tell what defines a gain or loss
for a specific investor or to predict frames (Fischhoff, 1983;
Barberis, 2013). For instance, investors may consider gains
and losses in overall wealth, or in the value of their securities,
or in the value of a certain asset. If we focus on a specific
stock, a return that is positive may be considered a gain, or
a return that exceeds the risk-free rate. Timing poses a fur-
ther problem. Does the investor fixate on weekly, monthly,
annual or lifetime gains and losses? This is the problem of
choice bracketing Broad bracketing, which allows people to
con¬sider all the consequences of their actions, often leads
to superior decisions (Read et al., 1999).
Numerous studies attempt to connect risk preferences with
demographic factors such as age, gender and education.7
As a rule, risk tolerance strengthens with a higher level of
schooling, e.g., a university education (Riley & Chow, 1992;
Halek & Eisenhauer, 2001; Hartog et al., 2002; Dwyer et al.,
2002).
Generally, women are more risk-averse (e.g., Bajtelsmit &
Bernasek, 1996; Powell & Ansic, 1997; Byrnes et al., 1999;
Schubert et al., 1999; Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Lusardi &
Mitchell, 2008; Croson&Gneezy, 2009)whilemen aremore
overconfident than women (e.g., Barber & Odean, 2000;
Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2008).
With respect to age, the evidence is more ambiguous. For
example, Mikels and Reed (2009), Nielsen et al. (2008),
and Albert and Duffy (2012) find that, compared to young
adults, the elderly are more risk-averse for losses. Lauriola
and Levin (2001), and Weller et al. (2011) indicate that the
same is true for gains. On the other hand,Mather et al. (2012)
suggest that aging instigates risk-seeking in the domain of
losses, and Samanez-Larkin et al. (2007) and Thomas and
Millar (2012) find no link, either for losses or gains, between
risk attitudes and growing older. If measured by the ratio
of risky assets to total wealth, risk tolerance may rise with
age (Wang & Hanna, 1997). Regarding the link between age
6The final causes of the housemoney effect remain unclear. People often
contrast outcomes tomental simulations of whatmay have been or whatmay
come to pass. Salient counterfactuals set off emotions, positive or negative,
such as regret. For instance, past trauma and recollection of fear bolster
cautiousness (Callen et al., 2014; Cameron & Shah, 2015). Strahilevitz et
al. (2011) study this type of reinforcement learning with trading data from
two brokerage firms. Many investors avoid stocks for which past purchases
ended in losses. Conversely, Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) report that people
are more likely to subscribe to initial public offerings of equity if their past
personal experience with IPOs was positive. More generally, Arkes et al.
(1994) argue that unexpected gains may be put in a windfall (“fun money”)
account outside usual financial plans, or in no account at all, and that the
surprise element itself explains why people bet more. The issue is related to
the subtleties of reference point adaptation which may be quicker and more
complete for gains than for losses (Arkes et al., 2008).
7Wide-ranging literature reviews of financial risk-taking, surveying both
experimental and empirical studies, include Roszkowski (2001) and Grable
(2008).
and the fraction of equity in investment portfolios (“the risky
share”), there is no consensus.8
As a final point, we note that past gains and lossesmay also
guide financial decisions for the reason that they change peo-
ple’s beliefs, e.g., about their power to generate precise return
forecasts or to control risk. Moore & Healy (2008) discuss
various aspects of overconfidence. The experiments of Nosić
& Weber (2010) imply that poor calibration encourages ag-
gressive risk-taking. Merkle (2017) reports related empirical
findings.9 Clearly, outcomes that validate a person’s beliefs
or actions elevate confidence. People may fantasize that
success primarily reflects personal ability. Self-assessments
of competence correlate with self-assurance (Graham et al.,
2009). That many people hold inflated views of themselves,
and are also unaware of it (Kruger & Dunning (1999).
3 Data
A private bank provided us with access to data. We are
not allowed to disclose its name, but we can reveal that the
bank is located in Northern Italy and that it is one of the
five market leaders in financial planning, operating across
Italy through a network of more than 1,000 financial advis-
ers. As shown on http://www.assoreti.it, the website of the
Associazione delle Società per la Consulenza agli Investi-
menti, the customers of banks such as ours typically have
portfolios invested primarily, if not exclusively, in mutual
funds, managed portfolios, insurance and pension funds. A
fraction of clients, about 1 percent, use a part of their port-
folio, usually between 5% and 10%, for direct investment
in shares and/or bonds. With reference to this portion of
the portfolio, managed autonomously, some clients adopt a
buy-and-hold approach, i.e., they buy securities and hold
them over extended periods of time. Others perform trading
operations.
We created a data set using several criteria. First, we only
consider investors with a total portfolio at the bank worth,
on average, about e300,000 and with a portfolio that has
two parts. The first piece, representing roughly 90% of its
value, is administered with the supervision of a personal fi-
nancial adviser. The second piece, corresponding to roughly
10%, is managed by the investor on his/her own via home
banking. We label this part the “trading portfolio”. It is the
main object of our study. Second, we study investors’ asset
allocation decisions related to their trading portfolios during
8Poterba & Samwick (2001) find that the risky share increases with age.
While the age profile for financial ownership is hump-shaped, the share of
risky assets tends to be flat (Guiso et al., 2002). According to Fagereng et al.
(2013), the hump-shaped pattern peaks around retirement. But Foerster et
al. (2017) say that the risky share peaks around age 40 and falls as retirement
approaches.
9Related empirical studies in financial economics include Blume &
Friend (1975), Odean (1999), Barber & Odean (2000), and Grinblatt &
Keloharju (2009). De Bondt (1998) offers a brief survey.
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the calendar year 2015. In particular, we analyze data for
clients who adjust their trading portfolios — at least once
a month — but do not refashion the overall strategy of the
total portfolio during 2015. This element is essential since,
in some cases, financial advisers suggest specific asset allo-
cation modifications, and clients may well apply the advice
to their trading portfolios. To repeat, in order to be able to
observe portfolio revisions made by clients in complete au-
tonomy, we include only investors who never alter the asset
allocation of the total portfolio under management but who
do modify the trading portfolio.
Third, we exclude bank clients who add or withdraw funds
(say, for consumption purposes) from their trading portfolio
between January and December 2015. This makes it much
easier for them to calculate and to mentally grasp monthly
percentage returns and monetary gains or losses (in Euro).
Finally, we exclude clients who, for whatever reason, are
not permitted by bank rules and procedures to raise their
portfolio VaR into category 5, i.e., the maximum. Overall,
our panel data set comprises data for 62 investors. For each,
we have statistics regarding age, gender, level of education,
the value of the trading portfolio, monthly gains and losses,
and variations in portfolio risk exposure, i.e., the private
bank’s estimates of the VaR of the trading portfolio. Our
data are snapshots of portfolio value and VaR at the end of
each month between January and December 2015.10 We
note that the subjects in the sample have access to the same
information and, of course, much more. On a bank website,
they can inspect the composition of their trading portfolio,
the account balance, and the VaR at any time, and as often
as they wish. (The VaR is calculated around-the-clock.)11
4 Hypothesis and Methods
Monthly changes in VaR are the dependent variable in the
analysis that follows. In effect, we pretend that, at every
month’s end, each individual subject faces a “decision point”
where the performance of the trading portfolio over the most
recent month is evaluated. At that time, the investor may
resolve to vigorously correct the strategy. Only substantial
adjustments would lead to a category change in VaR that
becomes detectible, straightaway, over the current month.
The main predictors of ∆VaR that we employ below are
either a gain/loss dummy variable for changes in value of
10We do not know the exact composition of the trading portfolios but we
do know that they typically include a variety of financial instruments (e.g.,
stocks, bonds, commodities, derivatives, funds, ETFs and various insurance
products).
11Investors also have continuous access to the same data for the full
portfolio. The website does not separately indicate recent changes in VaR.
If the VaR were to exceed the maximum allowed level for a given client, the
bank directly contacts that client so as to enforce relevant regulations and
to avoid a mishap. However, the maximum allowed VaR for the investors in
our sample (VaR = 5) is the maximum allowed under Italian law. Therefore,
these subjects may adjust the riskiness of their portfolio as theywish without
interference from the bank.
the trading portfolio during the prior month (priorGLD)
(gain=1) or the percentage portfolio return (multiplied by
100) for the prior month (prior RET).
To be fully clear, consider an investor who at the beginning
of month #1 has a trading portfolio of e100 (V1) invested
in stocks and bonds with a VaR equal to 3. During the
month, the investor performs at least one transaction that
may modify the asset allocation within the trading portfolio
and may produce a gain or a loss. Imagine that at the end of
month #1 (which is also the start of month #2), the trading
portfolio asset allocation is changed in terms of stocks and
bonds so as to achieve a VaR equal to 4 and the value of
the portfolio value is now e110 (V2). In this example, the
investor obtains a gain of V2 − V1 and records an increase
in VaR from 3 to 4, so that the ∆VaR is +1. See Figure 1.
The main hypothesis tested below is that paper invest-
ment gains that are earned over an initial period embolden
individuals to accept more risk during a later period. Con-
versely, current paper losses cause people to diminish risk
afterward. We check whether changes in the VaR-category
of the trading portfolio during month t (∆VaR) are predicted
by investor-specific portfolio gains or losses during month
t − 1.12
At first glance, the hypothesis appears to challenge
prospect theory since we propose that achievement promotes
adventure and failure invites prudence. This is false. We
relate present changes in risk behavior (observed through
fluctuations in VaR) to past returns. The time dynamics are
key. Vis-à-vis decision-making under risk, not only future
risk and return matter to investors, but so does history.
Our customized data set and empirical methods intend to
reproduce a natural experiment, i.e., a study in which nature,
i.e., factors outside our control, exposes clusters of indi-
viduals to dissimilar experimental and control conditions.
Importantly, the process that governs exposures resembles
random assignment. To repeat, we have access to portfolio
values and VaRs at the end of each month between January
and December 2015. This makes 62 investors ×11 months
= 682 observations of ∆VaR, priorGLD, and prior RET .
Since we relate changes in risk to prior month returns, the
first set of 62 ∆VaRs that may be analyzed are for March
2015. The last set is for December 2015. All in all, we
are able to examine investor behavior at 620 decision points
which occur at the end of February 2015 through the end of
November 2015 as subjects come to grips with the monthly
performance of their trading portfolios.13
12It would seem that only sizeable past value changes can cause VaR to
cross a threshold. As stated earlier, there are six VaR categories. In only
two instances (out of 620 decision points) did a portfolio jump two VaR
categories in adjacent months. Thus, nearly all one-month ∆VaRs were +1,
0 or −1. (This also explains our later use of ordered logit regressions.)
13Accordingly, the analysis does not employ the 62 VaR estimates for
February 2015 and the 62 gains or losses for December 2015. This rule
does not apply to some of the descriptive statistics.












































Figure 1: Overview of the data and the hypothesis.
Since we have panel data, we estimate random-effects
ordered logit regressions with changes in portfolio risk levels
(∆VaR) as a categorical dependent variable.14 Age, gender,
education, and the total value of the trading portfolio at the
end of the previous month serve as control variables. The
main regression is:
∆VaR = β0 + β1 Age + β2Gender + β3Education
+β4V alue + β5prior RET + ε
Likewise, we run the same regression with priorGLD substi-
tuting for priorRET. We also conduct a string of robustness
tests.
5 Results
The main result is that, as hypothesized, the subjects become
more risk-averse after suffering losses and more risk-seeking
after experiencing gains, from month to month. Relevant
details for this result are in Section 5.2. Section 5.1 provides
basic descriptive statistics.
14Although it may be of interest to compare the random and fixed effect
estimates, there is no unanimity in the literature on how to implement a
fixed effect estimator for an ordered logit model (see Baetschmann et al.,
2015). The results reported below appear to be robust despite significant
effort on our part to do away with them.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables 1, 2 and 3 offer descriptive statistics for 62 private
bank clients. Hereafter, we briefly state — and further illus-
trate — the main facts in these tables.
The mean VaR across 682 monthly observations was 2.90.
The 2015 age of the individuals in the sample varied between
35 and 65 years. On average, the subjects were 47 years old.
Sixteen (26%) were women; 44% were university-educated.
(Women were equally distributed between education levels.)
The mean trading portfolio balance, across investors and
months, was e30,952. The minimum was e20,204 (in-
vestor #14, female, with a high-school education, age 55,
and an average monthly VaR of 2.00) while the maximum
was e46,125 (#25, male, high-school educated, 57, VaR
3.00).
The largest recorded loss in portfolio value between Jan-
uary and December 2015 was e13,000 (an 11-month return
of −38.2% for #37, male, high-school educated, 41, VaR
2.92); the largest recorded gain came to e9,000 (a return of
32.1% for #33, female, university-educated, 40, VaR 2.42).
The median investor lost e150.
Panel B in Table 1 shows data similar to panel A but
for subsamples arranged by age, gender, education, and the
monthly average trading portfolio balance. On average, older
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 62 private bank clients. Panel A describes bank client age (in years), the value of the
trading portfolio (Value, average of 12 monthly observations, in Euro), the change in portfolio value between end January
and end December 2015 (∆Value), and the value-at-risk category (1 to 5). Panel B shows means for subsamples of (1) men
(M) and women (F), individuals (2) who are standard- or high-educated (LE and HE), (3) young or old, relative to the median
sample age (Y and O), and hold (3) small or large trading portfolios, relative to the value of the median portfolio (SM and LG).
We run t-tests for differences in means and Mann-Whitney U tests. The null hypothesis is that the sample means are equal.
* (**) indicates statistical significance at the 5 (1) % level for t-tests; + (++) does the same for nonparametric tests.
Panel A: Full sample (62 observations)
Mean Median S.D. Minimum Maximum
Age 46.8 44.2 8.2 35.2 64.5
Value 30,952 29,983 6,785 20,204 46,125
∆Value -85 150 3,249 -13,000 9,000
VaR 2.90 2.92 0.69 2.00 5.00
Panel B: Subsamples
Gender Education Age Portfolio value
Obs. M(46) F(16) LE(35) HE(27) Y(31) O(31) SM(31) LG(31)
Age 47.6 44.6 49.3 43.7 ∗∗ + 40.2 53.5 ∗∗ ++ 48.1 45.6
Value 32,001 27,935 ∗ + 29,743 32,518 32,122 29,789 25,269 36,634 ∗∗ ++
∆Value −118 13 −649 647 −344 174 −281 112
VaR 3.08 2.39 ∗∗ ++ 2.77 3.08 3.09 2.72 ∗ 2.70 3.10 ∗ +
Table 2: Pearson pairwise correlations, calculated for the 620 observations that correspond to the ordered logistic regressions
estimated later in Table 5. Variables are measured monthly (at the end of month t) except Value, priorGLD and priorRET which
are measured with respect to month t −1. ∆VaR is the portfolio value-at-risk category (1 through 5, with 5 indicating high risk)
at the end of current month minus the value-at-risk at the beginning of the current month. VaR is the value-at-risk at the end of
the current month. Age is measured in years. Gender is a dummy variable (female=1) and so is Education (high education=1).
Value denotes portfolio value (in Euros) at the end of the previous month (which is the start of the current month). priorGLD
is a dummy variable equal to one if the portfolio gained in value during the previous month. priorRET denotes the portfolio
return during the previous month. RET is the portfolio return during the current month.
∆VaR Age Gender Education Value priorGLD priorRET RET
Age −0.025 1
Gender −0.015 −0.159 1
Education −0.002 −0.332 0.082 1
Value −0.059 −0.114 −0.247 0.186 1
priorGLD 0.200 −0.007 0.003 −0.033 0.117 1
priorRET 0.183 −0.016 −0.001 0.034 0.166 0.656 1
RET 0.440 −0.006 0.001 0.030 −0.125 0.217 0.286 1
VaR 0.250 −0.230 −0.376 0.191 0.319 0.183 0.200 0.112
investors ran portfolios with somewhat lower VaRs but the
difference is not large. Compared to the men, the women
in the sample managed portfolios that were about e4,000
smaller with VaRs that were much lower. (Note the t- and
Mann-Whitney U-tests.) Subjects with a university degree
were on average 5½ years younger than high-school gradu-
ates. Larger portfolios displayed higher VaRs.
Some of the relationships thus far discussed are also visi-
ble in Table 2, a correlation matrix.
It shows that the current monthly returns earned by indi-
vidual investors (RET), these same returns for the previous
month (measured either by priorRET and priorGLD, the
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Table 3: Portfolio VaRs, values, gains and losses, by month. Panel A shows VaRs by month, averaged across 62 subjects;
the monthly fraction of subjects who raise or cut VaR; monthly cross-sectional averages of portfolio values, and of the ratios
of the smallest and the largest portfolios relative to the mean portfolio. Panel B shows mean, minimum and maximum returns
by month (in percent). In addition, it lists the fraction of all portfolios that rise in value during the month; the average gain or
loss (in Euros) across all portfolios; and the matching monthly cross-sectional average of the absolute changes in value (in
Euros).
Value of portfolios (in Euros)
Panel A Mean VaR ∆VaR%+ ∆VaR%− Mean Min/Mean Max/Mean
January 2.71 na na 29,181 0.69 1.44
February 2.74 0.03 0.00 30,364 0.66 1.47
March 2.89 0.16 0.02 31,089 0.65 1.48
April 3.05 0.18 0.02 31,931 0.62 1.50
May 3.18 0.15 0.02 32,820 0.62 1.51
June 3.15 0.05 0.08 33,541 0.61 1.52
July 3.19 0.05 0.00 33,887 0.60 1.53
August 3.13 0.02 0.08 33,192 0.62 1.63
September 2.76 0.00 0.34 29,573 0.61 1.45
October 2.65 0.03 0.15 28,281 0.62 1.45
November 2.65 0.03 0.03 28,463 0.63 1.44
December 2.76 0.15 0.03 29,096 0.64 1.45
ALL 2.90 0.08 0.07 30,952 0.57 1.74
Panel B Portfolio returns (in %) Portfolio gains or losses (in Euros)
Mean Minimum Maximum % gains Aver. Aver. abs.
February 3.75 −2.36 13.04 0.94 1, 184 1, 258
March 2.24 −4.26 9.93 0.84 725 973
April 2.31 −3.46 10.89 0.76 842 1, 034
May 2.47 −6.90 16.51 0.76 889 1, 163
June 2.11 −6.19 12.50 0.76 721 1, 014
July 0.87 −7.00 9.38 0.73 346 730
August −2.51 −30.95 9.75 0.55 −695 1, 618
September −12.20 −69.57 1.82 0.08 −3, 620 3, 675
October −4.76 −22.22 5.41 0.19 −1, 292 1, 553
November 0.61 −8.70 10.26 0.69 182 734
December 2.09 −9.52 13.33 0.89 633 778
ALL −0.29 −69.57 16.51 0.65 −8 1, 321
gain/loss dummy), the VaRs and ∆VaRs are all strongly pos-
itively correlated.
Table 3 shows some of the data month-by-month.
Between January and August 2015, the average portfolio
was rising in value. Thiswas followed by big negative shocks
in September and October. The same pattern emerges in
the monthly VaRs, averaged across bank clients. Also, in
all months but September, there were some subjects who
increased the value-at-risk of their portfolios; in all months
but July, some decreased VaR. About 2/3’s of all monthly
observations are gains; 8% are associated with increases in
∆VaR, 7%with decreases in∆VaR, and 85% cause no change
in value-at-risk.
The simple average monthly portfolio return was minus
29 basis points, equivalent to a loss of e8. In terms of
this investigation, the averages are deceptive, however. The























 Figure 2: Trading portfolio gains or losses in Euro (62 investors, 10 decision points each, February-November 2015).
Table 4: Monthly transitions between VaR categories. Panel A shows frequencies for 25 different types of VaR transitions as
well as the number of of portfolio gains and losses (over the previous month) associated with specific VaR transitions (during
the current month). In total, there are 620 decision points that lead to 98 VaR transitions to a different category. Panel B lists
equivalent percentages totaling to 100 percent. Panel C shows the average Euro gain or loss for all transitions of a given
type.
VaR category at the
start of the month
VaR category at the end of the month
Low risk 2 3 4 High risk
Panel A: of VaR transitions with gains or losses over the prior month
Low risk 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 190/105/85 22/19/3 0 0
3 0 22/7/5 214/136/78 25/21/4 0
4 0 1/1/0 20/6/14 97/73/24 3/3/0
High risk 0 0 1/1/0 3/1/2 22/17/5
Panel B: Fraction of VaR transitions (total = 100%)
Low risk 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
2 0.0% 30.6% 3.5% 0.0% 0.0%
3 0.0% 3.5% 34.5% 4.0% 0.0%
4 0.0% 0.2% 3.2% 15.6% 0.5%
High risk 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 3.5%
Panel C: Average gain or loss over the prior month (in Euros)
Low risk na na na na na
2 na −483 350 na na
3 na −1,120 19 1,024 na
4 na 700 −2,001 522 533
High risk na na 500 −200 982
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absolute monthly change in portfolio value, averaged across
individuals, is e1,321; the same statistic calculated for two-
month periods is e2,294, and it is e3,202 for three-month
periods. Figure 2 is a histogram with all one-month gains
and losses for all subjects between February to November
2015. Evidently, most monthly value changes are modest,
and cannot be expected to prompt changes in risk-taking,
but a considerable number are very large relative to the size
of the portfolio. As seen in Table 3, the cruelest monthly
shock was a loss of e16,000 in September (−69.57% for
#28, female, 41, high-school educated, VaR 2.83); the best
result was a gain of e7,100 in May (+16.51% for #1, male,
35, university-educated, VaR 4.50).
5.2 TallyingVaR transitions and regression ev-
idence
In a simple analysis, we regressed the change inVaR category
on whether the previous month showed a gain or a loss, for
each subject. Of the regression coefficients, 39were positive,
2 were negative, and 21 were 0. This difference suggests that
changes of the last month affect risk taking in the present
month.
For a more complete analysis, Table 4 (panel A) presents
the transition matrix describing the frequency with which
investors move their portfolios from one VaR category to
another.
Each cell lists the total number of cases, the number
of cases associated with portfolio gains during the previ-
ous month, and the ones associated with losses during that
month. Panel B shows the fraction of VaR transitions of
different types, and panel C lists the matching averageegain
or loss, averaged across all observations for the matrix cell.
Since the largest percentages are on the main diagonal of
panel B, Table 4 indicates that investors tend to preserve
the status-quo level of VaR. Values outside the diagonal
and other than zero represent the changes in VaR which we
want to explain. The average ∆VaR is close to zero, and
this remains true even if we exclude the 85% of cases on the
diagonal. Some individuals changed VaR as often as three
or four times during 2015. Others never did.
The main insight derived from Table 4 is that VaR in-
creases (from 2 to 3, from 3 to 4, and from 4 to 5) are allied
with a high proportion of gains and high averageegains dur-
ing the previous month. VaR decreases (from 3 to 2, from
4 to 3, and from 5 to 4) are coupled with a high proportion
of losses and high average elosses.15 This agrees with our
main hypothesis.
Figure 3 presents a different route to the same destination.
There, all past one-month gains or losses, previously shown
in Figure 2, are sorted into quintiles and, for each quintile, we
15Broadly similar patterns are visible in matrices (equivalent to Table
4) for subsamples of men, women, high-school and university-educated
subjects.
find the fraction of all VaR increases and all VaR decreases
associated with it. The results are crystal clear. Nearly half
of all VaR decreases accompany the 20% of months with
the worst portfolio performance. Also, roughly 70% of all
VaR increases follow months with portfolio value changes
in the top 40%. Lastly, the middle quintile shows less than
proportional VaR increases and decreases. If past gains or
losses did not bring about changes in risk-taking, all bars in
Figure 3 should have been of the same height.
Table 5 displays the regression results for the full sample
and various subsamples.
The cut-off points in the table are auxiliary parameters that
separate the four categories of the dependent variable (∆VaR)
is +1, 0, −1, or −2). Equality tests strongly reject the null
hypothesis that the cut-off points are equal— confirming the
relevance of the four categories. For the sample as a whole,
the results indicate that, except for education, all variables
contribute in a significant way. The results are fairly uniform
across subsamples.16 Older subjects are less likely to appear
in the top category, i.e., their risk appetite is lower. The
same applies to women, and to clients with somewhat more
abundant portfolios.
6 Conclusion
In the financial industry, and also in finance theory, the as-
sessment of investor risk profiles is normally seen as a el-
ementary step toward identifying asset portfolios that are
most appropriate to serve client needs. Past studies find that
risk tolerance varies with demographic factors that change
slowly over time or not at all. Here, we offer direct evi-
dence that risk preferences and/or beliefs about one’s ability
to manage risk and return evolve from month to month and
in direct response to recent portfolio performance. This is
shown for a sample of genuine investors who act on their own
without external advisory influence. All told, fast-changing
circumstances predict fast-changing risk attitudes.
If correct and characteristic of the behavior of important
segments of the financial community, our empirical findings
appear to offer some circuitous support formodern asset pric-
ing theory in the manner of Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
and others. The fact that we study active traders likely helps
to explain why our results are so markedly different from
the inertia reported by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) who,
based on data from the Panel of Income Dynamics, report
that most U.S. households do not adjust the share of their
16In addition, we run regressions, not shown in Table 5, with dummy
variables controlling for the month of the year; with gain/loss dummies
and/or returns measured over the previous two months, or over the previous
three months; with a gain/loss dummy and the return for the current month
included; and with Value left out of the regression. None of these variations
destroy the apparent explanatory power of past performance for later ∆VaR.














 Figure 3: Fraction of all bank-recorded VaR increases or decreases by quantile of gains or losses over the prior month (620
decision points).
Table 5: Which factors cause variation in Value-at-Risk?
We estimate random-effect ordered logistic regressions. The dependent variable is ∆VaR. The predictor variables are Age (in years), Gender (female=1),
Education (high education=1), the value of the portfolio at the beginning of the month (in thousands of Euros), a gain/loss dummy (PriorGLD, gain=1) for
the change in portfolio value during the prior month, and the portfolio return during the prior month (PriorRET, in percent). The regressions are for the full
sample and for subsamples. ∗∗∗ is p < .01; ∗∗, p < .05; ∗, p < .10. S.E., clustered by individual investor, are in parentheses.
Full sample Men Women Standard-educated Highly-educated
Age −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗ −0.01∗ −0.03 −0.04 −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.00 −0.00
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.026) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
Gender −0.34∗∗ −0.33∗∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.26∗ −0.38 −0.44
(0.132) (0.148) (0.141) (0.152) (0.253) (0.278)
Education 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.03 −0.12
(0.109) (0.117) (0.126) (0.142) (0.292) (0.269)
Value −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.041) (0.042) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.021)
priorGLD 1.39∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.313) (0.487) (0.408) (0.320)
priorRET 0.07∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.01 0.07∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.033) (0.020)
cut-off 1 −7.02∗∗∗ −8.06∗∗∗ −6.41∗∗∗ −7.74∗∗∗ −5.61∗∗∗ −6.35∗∗ −7.27∗∗∗ −8.31∗∗∗ −6.86∗∗∗ −7.80∗∗∗
(0.864) (0.916) (0.822) (0.963) (2.391) (2.291) (1.327) (1.430) (1.046) (1.039)
cut-off 2 −3.75∗∗∗ −4.79∗∗∗ −3.45∗∗∗ −4.71∗∗∗ −0.04 −1.09 −4.04∗∗∗ −5.08∗∗∗ −3.55∗∗∗ −4.47∗∗∗
(0.501) (0.550) (0.451) (0.556) (2.398) (2.154) (0.646) (0.715) (0.726) (0.911)
cut-off 3 1.59∗∗∗ 0.41 1.83∗∗∗ 0.60 1.55∗ 0.41 1.52∗ 0.43
(0.553) (0.554) (0.531) (0.557) (0.732) (0.730) (0.922) (0.873)
Obs. 620 620 460 460 160 160 350 350 270 270
Wald χ2 48.6∗∗∗ 31.8∗∗∗ 33.6∗∗∗ 41.8∗∗∗ 21.4∗∗∗ 3.8 19.2∗∗∗ 17.4∗∗∗ 35.4∗∗∗ 28.1∗∗∗
portfolios invested in risky assets following wealth changes,
and who find in favor of constant relative risk aversion.17
17Yet, risk-aversion intensified in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis, and many investors abruptly divested their stock holdings. Guiso et
al. (2018) list four possible channels but favor a fear-based explanation with
Our chief result, however, is that, for the Italian bank
clients in our sample, past portfolio performance — which,
as we have seen, can be quite erratic — predicts short-term
possibly long-lasting effects as suggested by Malmendier and Nagel (2011).
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variations in risk-taking quantified by value at risk. The
house money effect of Thaler and Johnson (1990) is not
discarded by our data set, and neither is the alternate view
that fluctuations in self-confidence, feeding an illusion of
control, is the main culprit. However, the tests do appear to
challenge Imas (2016).
The investors that we study are amateurs, not experts. Our
analysis agrees with the Dunning-Kruger effect (Kruger &
Dunning, 1999). Intuitively, it is plausible that amateurs
look at past performance, even if not realized, to divine the
future, especially when they act alone without highly trained
assistance. Success builds confidence; failure undermines
it.18 The switches from less risk tolerance to more, and
vice versa, on the basis of near past performance also lead
us straightforwardly to Bandura’s concept of self-efficacy.
The beliefs that people hold about their capabilities, e.g.,
the presence or lack of mastery, affect the quality of their
functioning. Self-efficacy has a bearing on thought patterns,
emotional arousal, and behavior (Bandura, 1982). The find-
ings in this article suggest to us that quite a few investors (i)
may eventually come to doubt their own skills, (ii) may no
longer put in much effort, and (iii) do not truly learn from
experience. As their self-efficacy erodes, they may have a
sense of futility, perhaps apathy.19 Of course, we recognize
that these last sentences are highly speculative, and neces-
sitate much more investigation. The results may also have
some limited practical/regulatory use. Italian banks and fi-
nancial intermediaries are required to monitor the level of
risk of their clients’ portfolios so as to avoid excessive loss
exposure and potential discontent. Financial advisers who
observe unusual trading and fluctuations in risk-taking may
use our findings for didactic purposes, leading clients to be
more sensible in their investments and thereby also building
more fruitful advisory relationships.
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